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BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE
FOR
NONDETERMINISTIC APPLICATIONS
BO CHEN
ABSTRACT

The growing reliance on online services accessible on the Internet demands
highly reliable system that would not be interrupted when encountering faults. A
number of Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) algorithms have been developed to mask
the most complicated type of faults — Byzantine faults such as software bugs,
operator mistakes, and malicious attacks, which are usually the major cause of service
interruptions. However, it is often difficult to apply these algorithms to practical
applications because such applications often exhibit sophisticated non-deterministic
behaviors that the existing BFT algorithms could not cope with.
In this thesis, we propose a classification of common types of replica nondeterminism with respect to the requirement of achieving Byzantine fault tolerance,
and describe the design and implementation of the core mechanisms necessary to
handle such replica nondeterminism within a Byzantine fault tolerance framework. In
addition, we evaluated the performance of our BFT library, referred to as ND-BFT
using both a micro-benchmark application and a more realistic online porker game
application. The performance results show that the replicated online poker game
performs approximately 13% slower than its nonreplicated counterpart in the presence
of small number of players.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The society is increasingly dependent on services provided by computer
systems and our vulnerability to computer failures is growing as a result: we expect to
have highly-available systems or applications that should work correctly and provide
services without interruptions. This requires the system or the application to be
carefully designed and implemented, and rigorously tested. However, considering the
intense pressure for short development cycles and the widespread use of commercialoff-the-shelf software components, it is not surprising that software systems are
notoriously imperfect. Problems such as software crashing, leaking of confidential
information, modify or deleting of critical data, or injecting of erroneous information
into the application data. These malicious faults often referred as Byzantine faults.
The Byzantine faults can be handled by replicating the server and employing a
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) algorithm as described in [2, 8, 17, 18].
Byzantine fault tolerance algorithms require the replicas to operate
deterministically, i.e., given the same input under the same state, all replicas produce
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the same output and transit to the same state. However, it is incorrect to assume that
practical applications will operate deterministically. Moreover it is equally incorrect
to categorize the determinism into a single type. Therefore, when a practical
application is replicated to tolerate Byzantine fault, its replica nondeterminism must
be analyzed carefully and be tackled properly to ensure replica consistency.
In previous research, although the replica nondeterminism issue has been
studied, it is limited to only the most simplistic forms of nondeterminisim, which we
term as nondeterminism and verifiable pre-determinable nondeterminism[2, 8, 17,
18]. The former assumes that any nondeterministic operations and their side effects
can be mapped into some pre-specified abstract operations and state, which are
deterministic. The later assumes that any nondeterministic values can be determined
prior to the execution of a request, and such values proposed by one replica can be
verified by other replicas in a deterministic manner, and the values are accepted only
if they are believed to be correct.
Therefore, new techniques must be carried out to cope with replicated
applications that exhibit other types of nondeterministic behavior to guarantee replica
consistency. For example, many online gaming applications contain some kind of
nondeterminism whose value [4, 14] (e.g., random numbers that determine the state of
the applications) proposed by one replica cannot be verified by another one. It is
incorrect to treat this type of replica nondeterminism the same as the verifiable predeterminable nondeterminism because a faulty replica could use a predictable
algorithm to update its internal state and collude with its clients, without being
detected, which defeats the purpose of Byzantine fault tolerance. As another example,
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multi-threaded applications may exhibit nondeterminism whose values [13] (e.g.,
thread interleaving) cannot be determined prior to the execution of a request (without
losing concurrency) which cannot be handled by existing BFT mechanisms.

1.1 Contribution
In this thesis, we introduce a classification of common types of replica nondeterminism present in many applications. We propose a set of mechanisms that can
be used to control these types of nondeterministic operations. We also describe the
implementation of the core mechanisms and their integration with a well-known BFT
framework [18]. More, specifically, we make the following research contributions:


We provide two types of motivating applications to illustrate the inadequacy
of current approaches to the problem of replica non-determinism



We provide a classification of common types of replica nondeterminism for
both Byzantine fault tolerance and benign fault tolerance.



We propose a unified framework to ensure consistent Byzantine fault tolerant
replication for applications exhibiting the nondeterministic behavior we have
classified.



We provide a preliminary implementation of the unified framework based on
the original BFT framework and report the performance evaluation results of
our prototype on handling different types of replica non-determinism.



We propose a alternative technology with better security result, however, the
performance of this technology is not as good as ND-BFT, thus there is still a
lot of future research to do on this topic.

3

1.2 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background
information. We start by describing BFT and other related techniques that used to
tolerate Byzantine fault, which is a big picture of what is Byzantine fault and how to
tolerant it. Chapter 3 describes ND-BFT: we explain the limitation of original BFT,
and provide a systematic classification of different type of replica nondeterminism.
The reminder of this chapter describes the corresponding solution for each type of
replica nondeterminism and the proof of correctness. The implementation of the NDBFT library, interface and online poker game that equipped ND-BFT library is
presented in Chapter 4. The detailed performance analysis for the ND-BFT library and
online poker game is described in the second half of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses
related work. Finally, our conclusions and some direction for future work appear on
Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

In this chapter, we present the background information including fault
tolerance, Byzantine fault tolerance and other Byzantine fault-tolerant techniques to
provide a big picture of the importance for a distributed system to obtain such
capabilities to tolerate Byzantine fault.
2.1

Fault Tolerance
In this section, we present the basic concept of fault tolerance to show the

importance for a distributed system to obtain such capability.
Fault tolerance, an important subject in distributed system design, is defined as a
capability that a system can mask the occurrence and recovery from failures. In other
words, a fault tolerant system can continue to operate without notice by outside in the
presence of failure.
A characteristic feature of distributed systems that distinguishes them from
single-machine system is the notion of partial failure. A partial failure may happen
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when one component in a distributed system fails. The failure may affect the proper
operation of other components, while at the same time leaving yet other components
totally unaffected. In contrast, a failure in non-distributed systems is often going to
affect all components, and may easily bring down the entire applications.
An important goal in distributed systems design is to construct the system in
such a way that it can automatically recover from partial failures without seriously
degrade the overall performance. In particular, whenever a failure occurs, the
distributed system should continue to operate in an acceptable way whiles repairs are
being made, that is, it should tolerate faults and continue to operate to some extent.
There are several types of failure exist during the operation as following:


Crash failure: A process simply halts



Omission failure: A process does not respond to incoming requests.



Timing failure: A process responds too sooner or too later to a request.



Response failure: A process responds a request in a wrong way.



Byzantine failure: A process exhibits any kind of failure.

Redundancy is the essence to achieve fault tolerance. When applied to
processes, the notion of process group becomes important. A process group consists
of several processes that closely cooperate to provide a service. In fault tolerant
process groups, one or more processes can fail without affecting the availability of the
services. Often, it is necessary that communication within the group be highly
reliable, and adheres to stringent ordering and atomicity properties to achieve fault
tolerance which is often referred as reliable group communication, or reliable multicasting.
6

2.2
2.2.1

Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Byzantine Fault
A Byzantine fault is an arbitrary fault that occurs during the operation by a

distributed system. When a Byzantine failure occurs, the system may respond in any
unpredictable way which exhibits in real world environment as computers and
networks behaves in unexpected ways due to hardware failures, software errors,
network congestion and disconnection, as well as malicious attacks. Those problems
become increasing crucial nowadays,. because people are increasingly depending on
online services.
The term “Byzantine faults” was originated from the classic Byzantine
General's problem[1], which several legions lead by one commander and several
lieutenants camped outside of the enemy’s castle and wait for commander's
command. To make sure each lieutenant gets the same command, each lieutenant is
required to send received command (attack or retreat) to the rest of the lieutenants.
However, there are one or more traitors; the traitor can be either lieutenant or
commander himself that they try to confuse other loyal lieutenants by sending
different commands to them. In that case, a loyal lieutenant may receive conflict
command and confuse about which one is true. And the campaign would be defeated
if the majority of the troops do not follow the same command. This problem can be
solved by the Byzantine Agreement: if there is one traitor, we need at least four
generals including one commander to make an agreement among the loyal generals. If
we using this solution in computer world, we can have following conclusion: to
7

tolerate f Byzantine fault, we need 3f+1 replicas. Figure 1 shows the proof of this
algorithm that for a single Byzantine fault, 4 replicas are needed. (a) If the
commander (i.e., primary replica) is faulty, he may send conflicting information to its
lieutenants (i.e., replica replicas). However, the lieutenants can exchange information
regarding what they heard from the commander and reach the correct decision (attack)
based on majority voting. (b) On the other hand, if a lieutenant is faulty, he may lie to
other lieutenants regarding the information he has heard from the commander. Other
lieutenants can still reach a correct decision based on majority voting. Reducing the
number of replicas to 3 cannot guarantee an agreement among the correct replicas.
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Figure 1: Byzantine Agreement (one traitor)

2.2.2

Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Byzantine fault tolerance [2, 8, 17, 18], a technique that is able to defend

against the Byzantine fault. A Byzantine fault tolerant system can reach the same
group decision regardless of the existence of Byzantine faulty replicas.
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Since distributed applications are often structured in terms of clients and
servers, each service comprises one or more servers and executes the clients' request.
The state machine replication technique is a general approach to build a fault-tolerant
system by replicating the servers and making them to behave identically. The
replicated servers coordinate the original server to reach an agreement to tolerate
faults. However, it is not enough for this approach to tolerate complicate Byzantine
fault.
Therefore, systems that provide critical services must behave correctly in the
face of Byzantine faults. Correct services in the presence of failures are achieved
through replications: the services runs t a number replicated servers and as more than
a third of the servers are non-faulty, the group as a whole continues to behave correct.
Byzantine fault tolerance algorithm, which initial by Castro and Liskov[8], is
state machine based protocol. A Byzantine faulty replica may use all kinds of
strategies to prevent the normal operations of the replicated services. In particular, it
might propagate conflicting information to other replicas or components that it
interacts with. To tolerate f Byzantine faulty replicas in an asynchronous environment,
we need to have at least 3f+1 number of replicas. An asynchronous environment is
one that has no bound on processing times, communication delays, and clock skews.
Internet applications are often modeled as asynchronous systems. Usually, one server
is designated as primary and the rest are replicas. The protocol move through a series
of views, each view is denoted by a view number. The primary for a given view is
determined based on the view number. Replicas remain in the current view unless the
primary is suspected of being faulty. If the primary behaves in an incorrect or timely
9

way, the other replicas will execute a view change, selecting a new primary by
internal vote and incrementing the view number and moving to a new view.
BFT algorithm has three communication rounds which is referred as threephase protocol in normal case operation as following:
Pre-Prepare

Invoked by the primary after receiving the request from the client that
it assigns a sequence number, view number and correspond
authenticator and multicast the PRE_PREPARE message to all
replicas.

Prepare

A replica broadcast the Prepare message to the rest of replicas after it
accepts the PRE_PREPARE message.

Commit

Once a replica receive 2f+1 PREPARE message that has the same
view number and sequence number as the PRE_PREPARE message,
then it broadcasting the COMMIT message to all replicas including
the primary.

A replica commits the corresponding REQUEST after it receives at least 2f
matching COMMIT messages from other replicas. To prevent a faulty primary that
intentionally delaying a message, the client starts a timer after it sends out the
REQUEST message and waits for f+1 responses from different replicas. Assuming f
replicas are faulty, at least one response must from a non-faulty replica. If the timer
expires, the client broadcasts the REQUEST message to all replicas and suspects the
primary. The rest replicas will then have an election to elect a new primary. In BFT
algorithm, digital signature or authenticator is employed to ensure the integrity of the
message, and a cryptographic hash function is used to compute message digests.
10

The normal case operation of BFT is illustrated in the Figure 2 below:

Figure 2: Normal Case Operation of BFT

2.3 Other Byzantine fault tolerant techniques
2.3.1 Paxos
Paxos[26] is a well-known fault-tolerant protocol that allows a set of
distributed servers, exchanging messages via asynchronous communication, to totally
order client requests in the benign-fault, crash-recovery model. One server is referred
as leader who coordination the transaction. If the leader crashes or becomes
unreachable, a view change occurs, allowing progress to resume in the new view
under the reign of the new leader. Paxos requires at least 2f+1 server to tolerate f
faulty servers. Only one reply is required to be delivered to the client due to the
servers are not Byzantine.
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In normal case operation, there is a single leader which is used to
communicate with the rest of servers. Paxos uses two asynchronous communication
rounds to globally order the client updates. The leader assign a sequence number to
the client and proposes this assignment to the rest of servers in the first round. In the
second round, any server agreed on the proposal will send an acknowledgment to the
rest of servers. When a server receives acknowledgment from the majority of replicas,
in other word, the majority servers have accepted the proposal – the server orders the
corresponding update.

2.3.2 Threshold digital signatures
Another well-known fault tolerant protocol is threshold digital signature which
often be referred as threshold cryptography that distributes trust among a group of
participants to protect information (e.g. Threshold secret sharing [28]) or computation
(e.g. Threshold digital signatures [29]).This mechanism is prompted by
Fragmentation-Replication-Scattering (FRS) which initially designed to provide
intrusion tolerance for file systems and was later ex-tended to object-based systems. A
(k, n) threshold digital signature scheme allows a set of servers to generate a digital
signature as a single logical despite (k-1) Byzantine faults. It divides a private key
into n shares, each owned by a server, such that any set of k servers can pool their
shares to generate a valid threshold signature on a message, m, while any set of less
than k servers is unable to do so. Each server uses its key share to generate a partial
signature on m and sends the partial signature to a combiner server, which combines
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the partial signatures into a threshold signature on m. The threshold signature is
verified using the public key corresponding to the divided private key.
RSA shoup scheme [29], a representative example of practical threshold
signatures, allows participant to generate threshold signatures based on the standard
RSA digital signature. It provides verifiable secret sharing (i.e., the ability to confirm
that a signature share was generated using a valid private key share), which is critical
in achieving robust signature generation in Byzantine environment.

13

CHAPTER III

BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE FOR
NONDETERMINISTIC APPLICATIONS

In this chapter, we first, describe the system model of ND-BFT, including its
operation, communication model and cryptography techniques. Then, we present the
threat analysis to show the importance of our protocol. After that, we provide a
systematic classification of replica nondeterminism and illustrate each solution for
different type of replica nondeterminism.

3.1 System Model
In this section, we present an overview of the system model which will be
used in following chapters. This model defines the operations provided by the system,
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assumptions on node failures and the communications infrastructure, and the
cryptographic primitives available for use by the ND-BFT protocol.

3.1.1 Operations
ND-BFT provides support for the execution of general operations. These are
distinct from simple reads and blind writes to services state, as provided by some
previous protocols. Reads and writes only allow directly reading or overwriting
objects at the server. General operations, however, allow for the execution of complex
operations that may depend on current state at the server, and provide a far more
power interface.
All operations should be deterministic, e.g., given a serialized order over a set
of operations, each replica should obtain the same result in running each operation,
provided they have the same application state, which is the purpose of this protocol.
3.1.2 Failure Model
Our system consists of a set C= {c1… ,cn} of client processes and a set R=
{r1,…,r3f+1} of 3f +1 server processes. Server processes are known as replicas
throughout this thesis, as they replicate the server application for reliability.
Servers are categorized into either correct server or faulty server. A correct
process is constrained to obey its specification, and follow the ND-BFT protocol
precisely. Faulty processes may deviate arbitrarily from their specification: we
assume a Byzantine failure model where nodes may adopt any malicious or arbitrary
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behaviors. The difference between fail benignly (fail-stop) and those suffering from
Byzantine fault is not described in this thesis.
The correct system operation is able to tolerate up to f simultaneously faulty
replicas. Transient failures are considered to last until a replica is repaired and has
reestablished a copy of the most recent system state. No guarantees are offered
beyond failures, and the system may halt or return incorrect responses to client
operations.
The number of faulty clients is not considered in this thesis. It is assumed that
application-level access control is implemented to restrict clients write to modify only
application state for which they have permission. A malicious client is able to execute
arbitrary write operations on data it has permission to access, but cannot affect other
application data nor put the system in an inconsistent state.

3.1.3 Communication Model
The communication model in this thesis is assumed as an asynchronous
distributed system where nodes are connected by Ethernet. We place very weak safety
assumptions on this network – it may fail to deliver messages, delay them, duplicate
them, corrupt them, deliver them out of order, or forward the contents of messages to
other entities. There are no bounds on message delays, or on the time to process and
execute operations. We assume that the network is fully connected; given a node
identifier, any node can attempt to contact the former directly by sending it a message.
For liveness, we require the use of fair links; if a client keeps retransmitting a
request to a correct server, the reply to that request will eventually be received.
16

Liveness for the BFT module used by ND-BFT also requires the liveness conditions
assumed by the BFT protocol. Notably, we assume that message delays do not
increase exponentially for the lifetime of the system, ensuring that protocol timeouts
are eventually higher than message delays. These assumptions above are not required
for liveness that the message delay is not guaranteed based on those assumption.

3.1.4 Cryptography
Our protocol requires highly cryptography to ensure its correctness. Clients
and replicas must be able to authenticate their communications to prevent forgeries.
We assume that nodes can use unforgeable digital signatures to authenticate
messages, using a public key signature schemes such as DSA. We assume a message
m signed by node n as <m> and no node can send <m>, either directly or as part of
another message, for any value of m, unless it is repeating a previous message or
known n’s private key. Any node can verify the integrity of a signature by the
message m and n’s public key.
We assume that the public keys for each node are known statically by all
clients and replicas, or available through a trusted key distribution authority. Private
keys must remain confidential, through the use of a secure cryptographic co-processor
or otherwise. If the private key of a node is hacked, then the node is considered faulty.
The security of the communication between pairs of nodes, despite message
transmission on untrusted links, is guaranteed by using Message Authentication
Codes (MACs). Each pair of node shares a secret session key, established via key
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exchange using public key cryptography. The notation <m>ux,y is used to describe a
message authenticated using the symmetric key shared by nodes x and y.
A collision-resistant hash function is assumed in our protocol that that any
node can compute a digest hm of message m, and it is impossible to find two distinct
messages m and m’ such that hm=hm’. The hash function is used to avoid sending full
copies of data in messages for verification purposes, instead using the digest for
verification.
Our cryptographic assumptions are probabilistic, but there exist signature
schemes and hash functions for which they are believed to hold with very high
probability. Therefore, we assume they hold with probability 1.0 in remainder of this
thesis. To avoid replay attacks, we tag certain messages with nonce that are signed in
replies.
3.2 Threat Analysis
This section explains the importance of replica consistency and the necessarily
to import our protocol to tackle nondeterministic data.
Byzantine fault tolerance system, which based on state machine replications,
must be deterministic to maintain the consistency of the system [12]. However,
practical applications always contain some forms of nondeterminism. For example,
the time-last-modified in a distributed file system is set by reading the server's local
clock; if this were done in-dependently at each replica, the states of non-faulty
replicas would diverge. When such applications are replicated to achieve fault and
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intrusion tolerance, their nondeterministic behavior must be tackled to ensure the
replicas consistency or totality.
The most difficult challenging for a software designer to designing a
distributed application is the consistency of the disseminated information, and the
control over the dissemination of that information. Therefore, the designer of a
distributed system would wish for a transport layer that provides a guaranteed
delivery-and-consistency of messages sent to multiple targets. Have such layer, most
distributed applications become much easier to implement and maintain. Thus, the
problem of consistency has received considerable attention when designing a
distributed system. MIT-BFT framework [18] strongly relies on the total ordering of
the message passed by each replica during its three phases. The total ordering of
messages requires a consensus decision. Without the guarantee of the consistency of
message in MIT-BFT framework, each replica might receives different request
command at the same phrase that the system would have conflicting operations which
may cause the crash of the entire system.

3.3 Type of Replica Nondeterminism
In the Byzantine fault tolerance algorithm [18] only one type of replica
nondeterminism behavior has been recognized. In this section, we analysis different
replica nondeterminism and classify them into three categories. Furthermore, we
mainly focus on two types of replica nondeterminism and divide them into four types
in order for us to build model to tackle their replica nondeterminism.
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 Wrappable nondeterminism. A type of replica nondeterminism that can be
simply controlled by an infrastructure-provided or application-provided
wrapper function, without explicit inter-replica coordination. For instance,
information such as hostnames, process ids, file descriptors, etc. can be
determined group-wise. Another situation is when all replicas are
implemented according to the same abstract specification, in which case, a
wrapper function can be used to translate between the local state and the
group-wise abstract state, as described in [19].
 Per-determinable non-determinism. A type of replica nondeterminism
whose value can be known before the execution of the request and it
requires inter-replica coordination to ensure replica consistency.
 Post-determinable non-determinism. A type of replica nondeterminism
whose values can only be recorded after the request is submitted for
execution and the nondeterministic values won’t be completed until the end
of the execution. It also requires inter-replica coordination to ensure replica
consistency.
In this thesis, we merely focus on last two type of replicas nondeterminism
since the wrappable replica non-determinism has been fully studied by [19] and can
be tackled by wrapper function without inter replica coordination.
We further classify the replica nondeterminism into two following types based
on whether a replica can verify the nondeterministic values proposed (or recorded) by
another replica.
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 Verifiable non-determinism. This type of replica nondeterminism whose
values can be verified by other replicas.
 Non-verifiable non-determinism. This type of replica non-determinism whose
values can not be fully verified by other replicas which means a replica might
be able to partially verify some nondeterminism values proposed by another
replica. This feature would help to reduce the impact of a faulty replica.
In order to implement current application or to develop new application to
efficiently handle each type of replica nondeterminism, we classification gives fours
types of replica nondeterminism of our interests:
 Verifiable pre-determinable non-determinism (VPRE). Previous study treated
clock-related operations as this type of operation. However, strictly speaking,
it is not possible for a replica to verify deterministically another replica's
proposal for the current clock value without imposing stronger restriction on
the synchrony of the distributed system (i.g., bounds on message propagation
and request execution).
 Non-verifiable per-determinable non-determinism (NPRE). This type of nondeterminism is exhibited as on-line gaming applications, such as Blackjack
and Texas Hold'em. These application requires highly randomness to ensure
the integrity of services [4], for instance, the card distributed to each player
must be unpredictable. Such application depends on the use of good secure
random number generators. For the security proposes, it is essential to make
one's choice of a random number unpredictable, let alone verifiable by other
replicas.
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 Verifiable post-determinable non-determinism (VPOST). We have yet to
identify a commonly used application that exhibits this type of nondeterminism. We include this type for completeness.
 Non-verifiable post-determinable non-determinism (NPOST). This type of
non-determinism is exhibited, in general, in all multi-threaded applications.
Ideally, the replicas should collectively determine the set of nondeterministic
values to prevent a single faulty replica from compromising the integrity of
other replicas [10]. However, it is not clear if it is always feasible for replicas
to apply a deterministic algorithm to decide on a common set of values from
those reported by individual replicas, in case of multi-threading. Furthermore,
it would require a test execution of every request at every replica, which might
be too expensive to be practical. Therefore, our current solution is to reply on
the information reported by a single replica (i.e., the primary replica) and to
employ additional recovery mechanisms to minimize the impact of faulty of
replica.

3.4 Solution for each type of replica non-determinism
In this section, we present the extensions of current BFT framework in
handling all common types of replica nondeterminism. The unified framework
requires closely coordination between BFT algorithm and the application be
replicated. Comparing with the APIs used in BFT framework [18], the following
server upcalls (i.e., callback functions registered by the server application) are
modified:
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Replica upcalls:
int propose_value(Seqno seqno, Byz_req *req, int *ndet_type, Byz_buffer
*ndet);
Here seqno is the sequence number assigned to the client's REQUEST, req is
request message, ndet_type is the type of replica nondeterminism when executing
client's REQUEST, and ndet is a pointer to the buffer that stores the nondeterministic
values. This function returns appropriate values to indicate if the call successful. Both
ndet_type and ndet are out-parameters, which mean the application is expected to set
their values.
Check replica non-determinism:
int check_value(Seqno seqno, Byz_req *req, int *ndet_type, Byz_buffer
*ndet)
This function is used to check the type of replica nondeterminism, which is
invoked when a replica want to verify the type of replica nondeterminism and the
nondeterministic values received from the primary. The parameters in this function
are the same as those in propose_value() function. The different between two function
is the parameters ndet_type and ndet in this function are in-parameters, which means
the information is passed to the application. The verification result is returned to the
caller in the return value.
Replica execute:
int execute(Byz_req *req, Byz_rep *rep, Byz_vuffer *ndet, int cid, bool ro)
In execute() function the signature is not modified, but the interpretation of
one of its parameters is changed. Parameter req is REQUEST message, rep is REPLY
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message to be generated by the replica, ndet is originally defined as a pointer to the
nondeterministic values obtained from the primary replica and to be used by all
replicas, i.e., it is intended to be used as in-parameter. It is not reinterpreted as an inout parameter which is depending on the type of replica non-determinism, for
instance, the parameter might be changed from in-parameter to out-parameter when a
replica has post-determinable nondeterminism and the function is invoked at the
primary replica.

Figure 3: System Architecture

The replica nondeterminism we classified in previous section are defined in
the form of four constant integer values as below:
 VERIFIABLE_PRE_DETERMINABLE
 NONVERIFIABLE_PRE_DETERMINABLE
 VERIFIABLE_POST_DETERMINABLE
 NONVERIFIABLE_POST_DETERMINABLE
The BFT algorithm is modified in following ways: when the client's
REQUEST arrives at the primary, if it is ready to order the message (when the
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number of ordered but not-yet executed message is smaller than the window
threshold), the primary invokes the propose_value() callback function registered by
the application layer. The application supplies the type of replica nondeterminism that
would be involved in the execution of the request, and if applicable, the
nondeterministic values. Depending on the type of replica nondeterminism returned
by the application, the modified BFT algorithm operates differently according to the
mechanisms described from section 3.4.1 through section 3.4.4.
We introduce two extra-phases: PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE, a phase before the
PREPARE and POST-COMMIT phase, a phase after COMMIT phase into the new
algorithm to handle replica nondeterminism in the modified BFT algorithm. We
introduce two new types of control message, PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE message
and POST_COMMIT message accordingly. The PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE message
is used in PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE phase for the replicas to reach the Byzantine
agreement on the collection of the nondeterministic values contributed by different
replicas when non-verifiable pre-determinable non-determinism is present. The
POST_COMMIT message is used in POST-COMMIT phase for the replicas to reach
athe Byzantine agreement on the nondeterministic values recorded by the primary
after it has executed a REQUEST message when post-determinable non-determinism
is present.

3.4.1 Verifiable Pre-determinable Non-determinism(VPRE)
If the type of replica nondeterminism at primary is VPRE, the primary calls
propose_value() function in its ndet parameter to propose the nondeterministic types
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and values. Then it includes the nondeterministic information into the
PRE_PREPARE message, and multicast the message to all replicas.
When the replica receives the PRE_PREPARE message, it calls check_value()
function to pass the nondeterministic information to upper layer. Then it verifies the
following information:


The type of replica nondeterminism for the client's REQUEST is consistent
with what is reported by the primary replica.



The nondeterministic values proposed by the primary is consistent with its
own values(not necessarily identical)

If the verification succeed, the replica will verify the nondeterminism type and
value proposed by the primary. After that, it accepts the REQUEST and the ordering
information, and it logs the PRE_PREPARE message and multi cast PREPARE
message to all other replicas. The following steps work the same as the original BFT
framework. On the other hand, if the verification fails, the replica will receive an error
code returned by check_value() function. The replica will then suspect the primary.
We illustrate the normal case operation in handling VPRE in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Solution to handle Verifiable Pre-Determinable Non-determinism

3.4.2 Non-Verifiable Pre-determinable Non-determinism(NPRE)
If the type of replica nondeterminism at primary is NPRE, that the replica
cannot verify other replicas' nondeterministic value for this type of nondeterminism,
consequently, the propose_value() function is called by the primary to propose its
share of nondeterministic values in ndet parameter. The nondeterministic information
is included in PRE_PREPARE message and the primary multicasts the message to all
replicas.
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When the replica receives the PRE_PREPARE message, it verifies the
REQUEST message and ordering information from the primary. Since for this type of
replica nondeterminism, the replica is not able to verify other replicas'
nondeterministic value, the replica, for this type of replica nondeterminism, will only
verify the nondeterministic type if the verification of REQUEST and ordering
information is succeed. After the verification of the nondeterministic value in
PRE_PREPARE message, the replica enters into PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE phase
by building and sending the PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE message
<PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE, v, n, d, t, b> to the primary, where v indicates the view
number in which the message is being sent, n is the sequence number, d is the request
message's digest, t is type of replica nondeterminism, and b is the value of replica
nondeterminism.
After the primary collect at least 2f valid PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE message
from different replica, it start to build PREPARE message, including 2f+1 (including
the primary itself) sets of nondeterministic values, each message is protected by the
proposer's digital signature or authenticator. The following steps operate according to
the original BFT model, except that the PREPARE and COMMIT message also carry
the digest of the nondeterministic values, and the 2f+1 set of nondeterministic values
are delivered to the application layer as part of the execute() call. We illustrate the
normal case operation in handling NPRE in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Solution to handle Non-Verifiable Pre-Determinable Nondeterminism

While we have described the mechanism to be used to handle this type of
replica nondeterminism, it is necessarily for us to further discuss the type of
applications that exhibit such replica nondeterminism and how our mechanism can be
used to improve the security and dependability of such applications.
For applications such as online poker games [4], the source of replica
nondeterminism is the most crucial state that should be protected since such values
are used as the seeds for the pseudo-random number generator to generate a random
number for the operations, such as shuffling cards. Such application replies on highly
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randomness of their values to maintain the integrity of the system. The process of
retrieving such nondeterministic values is often referred as entropy gathering (entropy
is defined as a measurement of the randomness of the data). The value can be
obtained either from hardware device, such as Geiger counter that counts the number
of radioactive decays detected, or using software solution, such as through sampling
keyboard or mouse events in a computer[14]. On the other hand, if such values are not
obtained from a high-entropy source, they might be predictable since the pseudo
random number generator is not truly random [14], and once seed is known,
consequently the output data from random number generator would also be known. In
practical, if the server of online poker game is compromised, and the seed which used
to generate the random number, or in another word the seed used to shuffle the cards
would be discovered by the person who hacked into the server. And he/she would be
able to cheat in the game.
Here we assume that a faulty replica cannot transmit the confidential state to
its colluding clients in real time. This can be achieved by using an application-level
gateway, or a privacy firewall as described by Yin [3], to block illegal replies. A
compromised replica may, however, replace a high entropy source to which it
retrieves the nondeterministic values with a deterministic algorithm, and convey such
algorithm via out-of-band covert channels to its colluding clients.
To counter such threats, such applications must be replicated using Byzantine
fault tolerant algorithm. Furthermore, each replica uses different methodology to
generate its nondeterministic values. In which case, a replica is in no position to verify
the non-deterministic values proposed by another replica. Ideally, a replica should not
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even know how other replicas generate their nondeterministic values, let alone to
verify them.
For each operation that requires nondeterministic input, the replicas should
collectively determine the input by applying the mechanism described in this section
which is essential in the entire operation, because otherwise, a single replica might be
able to compromise the whole service (despite the fact that there are at least 3f+1
replicas employed), which would jeopardize the intent of applying Byzantine fault
tolerance to such applications.

3.4.3 Verifiable Post-determinable Non-determinism(VPOST)
If the type of replica nondeterminism at primary is VPOST that the
nondeterministic value cannot be known before the execution of the request, the
primary, under this circumstance, only includes the nondeterministic type in the
PRE_PREPARE message without enclose any nondeterministic values. Then, the
primary multicasts the message to all replicas.
When the replica receives the PRE_PREPARE message, it verifies the
REQUEST message and the ordering information. If the verification succeed, the
replica will confirm the nondeterministic type associated with the REQUEST
message. The protocol then proceed to the COMMIT phase as usual. Otherwise, the
replica suspect the primary.
On receiving the returned parameters, it enters POST-COMMIT phase by
building POST_COMMIT message< <POST_COMMIT, v, n, d, t, b>,m>, where m is
the REQUEST message from client, b is the post-determined non-deterministic
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values, d is the digest of the REPLY. The primary, first, stores the in-formation into
the postnd log, and then it multicast the message to all replicas and sends the REPLY
message back to the client.
The replica will deliver REQUEST message if the Byzantine agreement on the
nondeterministic values for the REQUEST has been reached. If fail to reach the agreement,
or the verification of nondeterministic value is incorrect, the replica will suspect the
primary. Furthermore, the replica will suspect the primary if the REPLY does not match
with the REPLY's digest from the primary. However, despite the result of the comparison,
the replica produces the same REPLY using the same set of nondeterministic values. The
detailed processes describe as follow: when the replica receives the POST_ COMMIT
message from the primary, it checks the received nondeterministic values through the
check_value() upcall. If the verification succeed, the replica re-multicasts the
POST_COMMIT message with its own signature or authenticator to the rest of the
replicas. Otherwise, the replica suspects the primary. When a replica receives at least 2f
POST_COMMIT messages, which its nondeterministic values matches with other
replicas', it delivers the REQUEST message through the execute() upcall together with the
verified non-deterministic values. The replica then sends the REPLY to the client while the
execute() call returns.
A POST-COMMIT phase is required for the primary to disseminate the
information in the postnd log to duplicate the information and for all correct replicas
to ensure that they have received the same set of values for the corresponding
REQUEST. Unlike the PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE phase for controlling NPRE, the
POST-COMMIT phase involves with the entire steps needed for correct replicas to
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reach the Byzantine agreement on the nondeterministic values. It requires three
rounds of message exchange similar to those used to determine the ordering of the
requests under normal case operations. For NPRE, the PREPARE and COMMIT
phase are needed for the correct replicas to reach byzantine agreement on the
nondeterministic values. The nondeterministic values are integrated into the
corresponding request message. Due to the ordering information for the corresponding
request has already been decided, we could not do so for post-determinable
nondeterminism. We illustrate the normal case operation in handling VPOST in
Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Solution to handle Verifiable Post-determinable Nondeterminism

3.4.4 Non-Verifiable Post-determinable Non-determinism(NPOST)
If the type of replica nondeterminism at the primary is NPOST, the way to
handle such replica nondeterminism involves with the similar step as the way to
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handle VPOST as those described in previous section until the replica deliver the
REQUEST with post-determined nondeterministic values, as shown in Figure 6.
When the primary invokes the execute() upcalls and receives the REPLY and
non-deterministic values. It enters the POST-COMMIT phase by sending the REPLY
to the client. And then, it builds and multicast a POST_COMMIT message with
following information:
 The identity information for the REQUEST message such as the sequence
number assigned to the message, the view number, and the digest of the
message.
 The recorded nondeterministic values.
 The digest of the REPLY message.
When replica receives the POST_COMMIT messages, it verifies the
REQUEST information and re-multicast the message with its own signature or
authenticator to all replicas. Until the replica has collected at least 2f
POST_COMMIT messages which match with nondeterministic values from other
replicas, it prepares for the execution of the REQUEST message.
We must realize that a malicious primary may cause the confusion of the
replicas or block them from providing useful services to corresponding clients by
disseminating a wrong set of nondeterministic values. For instance, if the
nondeterministic data contains thread ordering information, a malicious primary can
arrange the ordering in such a way that it may lead to the crash of the replicas (e.g., if
the primary knows the existence of a software bug that leads to a segmentation fault),
or it may cause a deadlock at the replica (it is possible for a replica to perform a
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deadlock analysis before it follows the primary's ordering to prevent this from
happening).
Since in general the replica cannot completely verify the correctness of the
nondeterministic values until it actually executes the request, it is important for a
replica to launch a separate monitoring process before invoking the execute() call. If
the replica runs into a deadlock or a crash failure, the monitoring process can restart
the replica and suspect the primary.
If the replica can successfully complete the execute() upcall, it compares the
digest of its own REPLY message with that received from the primary. If those two
do not match, the replica suspects the primary. Regardless of the comparison result,
the replica sends the REPLY message to the client. It is safe to do so because if all
correct replicas produce the similar REPLY using the same set of nondeterministic
values(even if they might be different with the set actually used by the primary
replica, which implies that the primary is lying and suspicious), the result is valid.
A good example of this type of replica non-determinism is that of multithreaded applications [13]. When such applications are replicated, we must ensure
different threads access the shared data in the same order, otherwise, the state of
different replicas may diverge. Due to the complexity and dynamic nature of multithreaded applications, it is virtually impossible to pre-impose an access ordering
before the execution of a REQUEST. The only practical solution appears to be
executing a REQUEST at one replica, recording the access ordering of threads on
shared data, and propagating the ordering information to other replicas so that they
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follow the same thread ordering, as described above. We illustrate the normal case
operation in handling NPOST in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Solution to handle Non-Verifiable Post-determinable Non-determinism

3.5 Proof of Correctness
In this section we provide a proof of correctness of our mechanisms.
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Theorem 1: If a correct replica delivers a REQUEST m with a set
of nondeterministic data in view v, then no other correct replica
delivers m with a different set of nondeterministic data, and all such
correct replicas use, or record (at the primary), the same set of
nondeterministic data during its execution for m.
For VPRE, the primary replica proposes the nondeterministic data which
combine with the agreement on it is carried out together with the REQUEST. At the
end of the three-phase BFT algorithm, if some correct replicas agree on the ordering
of the REQUEST, they reach an agreement on the nondeterministic data as well. For
NPRE, the nondeterministic information is determined by the PRE-PREPAREUPDATE phase, and it is followed by three phase BFT algorithm. The correct replica
commits both the REQUEST m itself and reach the agreement on the associated
nondeterministic data. For both VPRE and NPRE, when the REQUEST m is
delivered at a correct replica, the non-deterministic data have been agree-upon are
also delivered and used for execution.
For VPOST and NPOST, the three-phase BFT algorithm agrees on the nondeterministic data among correct replicas during the POST-COMMIT phase. When a
correct replica receives the REQUEST m, it also receives the nondeterministic data
accompanied with m. A correct primary must log the nondeterministic data during the
execution of m, and have disseminated the data to replicas during POST-COMMIT
phase. Therefore, the same nondeterministic data are used for execution at the correct
client and other correct replicas.
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CHAPTER IV

IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION

4.1 Implementation
Our Byzantine fault tolerance for nondeterministicmapplication framework is
built by implementing MIT-BFT framework. Th open-source library from MIT. We
referred our implemented library as ND-BFT. And ourThe framework itself is
composed as a generic prog library with a simply interface. Section 4.1 describes the
library's implementation implementation of ND-BFTpresents its interface. To test our
ND-BFT library in real world application and for future research purposes, we
developed a poker game and used our imphe poker game with our ND-BFT library,
which described in section 4.3.

39

4.1.1 Library
ND-BFT library uses a connection model of communication. The
communication among each node is implemented using TCP, and multicast to the
group of replicas is implemented using TCP over IP multicast. The IP multicast group
contains all replicas while clients are not members of the multicast group. Replicas
and clients are structured as a set of handlers that containing a handler for each
message type and a handler for each timer. The handling loop works as following:
Replicas and clients wait in a select call for a message to arrive or for a timer deadline
to be reached and then they call the appropriate handler. The handler performs
computations similar to the correspond action in the formalization, and then it invokes
any methods corresponding to internal actions whose pre-conditions become true.
The SFS cryptography library is used to implement the public-key cryptosystem with a 1024-bit modulus to establish 128-bit session keys. All messages are
authenticated using message authentication codes computed using these keys and
UMAC32. Message digests are computed using MD5.
For our new protocol, the public-key cryptography encryption and decryption
are implemented to sign and verify the PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE and
POST_COMMIT messages. These signatures are non-existentially forgeable even
with an adaptive chosen message attack. MD5 still provide adequate security and it
can be replaced easily by more secure hash function at the expense of some
performance degradation.
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In previous section we described our protocol messages at a logical level
without specifying the size and layout of the different fields. While it is premature to
specify the detailed format of protocol messages without further experimentation, but
to understand the performance results in the next two chapters, it is important to
describe the format of PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE and POST-COMMIT, we also
describe the format of REQUEST and REPLY message in Figure 8 for the better
understand of the normal case operation.
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Figure 8: Message Format

The REQUEST header includes a MD5 digest of the string obtained by
combined by the client identifier, cid, the REQUEST identifier, rid, and the operation
being requested, op. It also includes the identifier of the designated replier. The flags
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in the REQUEST header indicates whether to use the read-only optimization and
whether the REQUEST contains a signature or an authenticator. In the normal case,
all requests contain authenticators. In addition to the header, the REQUEST message
includes a variable size payload and an authenticator. In the normal case, all
REQUEST messages contain authenticators. The authenticator is composed of a 64bit nonce, and n 64-bit UMAC32 tags that authenticate the REQUEST header. When
a replica receives a REQUEST, it checks if the corresponding MAC in the
authenticator and the digest in the header are correct.
The PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE message is assigned by the replicas when
encounter VPRE. The PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE header is composed of a view
number v, a sequence number n and an MD5 digest d of the
PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE payload, the REQUEST message’s id, a buffer that can
be filled with nondeterministic choice, and a number of bytes in the nondeterministic
values associated with the batch. The following payload includes the type of replica
nondeterminism. Additionally, the message includes an authenticator with a nonce,
and n-1 UMAC32 tags that authenticate the PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE header.
The POST_COMMIT message is used to handle VPOST and NPOST. The
POST_COMMIT header includes the view number v, the sequence number n, MD5
digest d of the POST_COMMIT payload, the replica's id, choice, ndetsz, and the
number of bytes in request inlined in the message, ireqsz. The variable size payload
includes the requests that are inlined, ireqs, and the nondeterministic choices, ndet.
The message also includes a corresponding authenticator.
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After the replica executes all the operations in the batch, it sends a reply to the
client. The reply header includes the view number v, the request identifier, rid, and
MD5 digest d of the operation result, the identifier of the replica, and the size of the
result in bytes, ressz. Additionally, the reply message contains the operation result if
the replica is the designated replier. The other replicas omit the result from the
REPLY message and set the result size in the header to -1. REPLY message contains
a single UMAC32 nonce and a tag that authenticates the REPLY header. The client
checks the MAC in the REPLY it receives. Client also checks the result digest in the
REPLY with the result.

4.1.2 Interface
The algorithm is implemented as a library with a very simple interface which
invokes some part of the library on client and some part on replicas.
On the client side, an initialization procedure is provided by library for the
client using a configuration file, which contains the public keys, the IP address, and
the port number of the replicas. The library also provides a procedure, invoke(), and
which is called to execute an operation. The procedure is responsible for the protocol
in the client side and returns the result when enough replicas have responded. The
library also provides a split interface with separate send and receives calls to invoke
requests.
On the server side, we provide an initialization procedure that takes an
argument: a configuration file with the public keys and IP addresses of replicas and
clients, the region of memory where the service state is stored, a procedure to execute
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requests, and a procedure to compute nondeterministic choices. When our system
needs to execute an operation, it does an upcall to the execute procedure. The
argument to this procedure includes a buffer with the requested operation and its
arguments, req, and a buffer to fill with the operation result, rep. The execute
procedure execute the operation for the service, using the service state. As the service
performs the operation, each time it is about to modify the service state, it calls the
modify procedure to inform the library of the locations about to be modified. When
the primary receives a request, it selects a non-deterministic value for the request by
making an upcall to the nondet procedure. The nondeterministic choice associated
with a REQUEST is also passed as an argument to the execute upcall.

4.1.3 Online Poker Game
We implement one online poker game, very familiar as Texas Holdem poker
game, a client/server based web application which supports multi-player network
players, and the ND-BFT library is installed on the server side. The type of replica
nondeterminism for this application is VPRE Figure 9 shows the architecture of this
game, as we have described in previous chapter. Because the purpose of creating this
game is merely to test the performance of our library that running under a practical
system, this game do not have complex GUI or structure that would slow down the
system performance. Figure 9 shows the architecture of this game.
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Figure 9: Architecture of online poker game with ND-BFT library

The normal operation of our game runs as the following:
On the client side, the client, first, establish a connection to the servers. And
then, according to the pre-configured configuration file, which defines the number of
player. For instance, if the number is 4, so if four clients connect to the servers, then
the game starts. Each player in the game sends the request to invoke the shuffling
function in server, and waiting for the reply from server. The player will pick the
majority reply from servers to make a final decision.
On the server side, each server initiate according to the configuration file
which also containing the IP address and port number, and then it waiting for enough
player to join the game. On noticed there are enough players, the server piggybacks
the acknowledgment information to client and waiting for client's request. On
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receiving the request, the server invokes the shuffling function which triggers the NDBFT library to handle the nondeterministic values. The execution of the clients'
request will be used to seed the random number generator to generate a random
number, and the output of the random number will modules by 52 to have a
corresponded number as a poker card to the player.

4.2 Performance Evaluation
The BFT library can be used to implement Byzantine-fault-tolerant systems
but these systems will not used in practice unless they perform well. This section
presents results of experiments to evaluate the performance of these systems. These
results show that these two extra phases we introduced in order to handle replica
nondeterminism under different circumstances do not degrade performance
significantly.
The experiments were performed using the setup in section 4.2.1. We describe
experiments to measure the value. Section 4.2.2 use benchmarks to evaluate the
performance during the normal case without checkpoint management, view changes
or recovery.
We implemented the core mechanisms in C++ and integrated them into the
BFT framework. The experiments described below are focused on the evaluation of
the cost for providing Byzantine fault tolerance to nondeterministic applications in the
BFT layer. The cost associated with recording nondeterministic values, verifying such
values, and replaying such values in the application layer is not studied in this work.
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4.2.1 Experimental Setup
The experiment consists of 14 nodes running RedHat 8.0 Linux. Of the 14
computers, 4 of them are equipped with Pentium-4 2.8GHz processors and the rest of
those computers have Pentium-3 1GHz processors. The computers are connected via a
16-port Netgear 100Mbps switch. The replicas run on Pentium-4 nodes and clients are
distributed across the rest of nodes.

4.2.2 Normal Case Operation
The experiment involves end-to-end latency and throughput measurements for
client-server application under normal operations for different types of replica nondeterminism, including composite types. Because of the experiments limitation, we
only enable 4 replicas to take care a single Byzantine fault. The rest of the servers act
as clients, and one server can be used as several clients with different port number. In
each iteration, each client issues a request to the server replicas and waits for the
corresponding reply. There is no waiting time between consecutive iterations. The
size of each request and reply are kept fixed at 1KB. In each run, we measure the total
elapsed time for 10,000 consecutive iterations at each client. From the measured time,
we derive the average end-to-end latency for each of the request-reply iteration and
the system throughput.
Figure 10 and 11 shows the end-to-end latency performance testing of our
library under the normal case operation with different type of replica nondeterminism.
Figure 10 shows the result of single type of replica nondeterminism which means the
replica only containing one type of replica nondeterminism including VPRE, VPOST,
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NPRE and NPOST. Figure 11 shows the result of composition type of replica
nondeterminism that the replica containing two types of replica nondeterminism. With
the increasing complexity construction of real-world applications, they could have
more than one type of replica nondeterminism. In our experiment we only consider
the applications involving two type of replica nondeterminism. The composited type
of replica nondeterminism in our experiment includes VPRE+NPRE, VPRE+VPOST,
VPRE+NPOST, NPRE+VPOST, NPRE+NPOST and VPOST+NPOST.
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Figure 10: End-to-End Latency of Pure Nondeterminism

The type of replica nondeterminism and the size of nondeterministic values
vary in different experiments, except for the throughput measurements, where the
non-deterministic values are kept at 256 Bytes for each type. Note that log the
nondeterministic values shown in the horizontal axis in Figure are for each type. That
means, for composite types, the total size of nondeterministic value is twice times as
large as those displayed.
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Obviously, we can see from the previous figures that the latency of VPRE
non-deterministic operation is noticeably smaller than that of other three
nondeterministic operations. That is because except for VPRE, the handling of other
types of non-determinism involves with one more phases of message exchanges for
correct replicas to reach an agreement on the nondeterministic values. As such, as
shown in Figure 9, the end-to-end latency is noticeably larger, and the throughput is
smaller, compared with that of VPRE nondeterministic operations. The end-to-end
latency difference is more significant as the size of nondeterministic values involved
with each operation increases. Since our system deploys a lightweight fault-tolerant
protocol, we expect it to achieve performance comparable to existing byzantine faulttolerant replication protocol. We compare the throughput performance of original
protocol where the replicas are deterministic with replica with different type of
nondeterministic value. From the comparison, we can see that the throughput for
deterministic replica is slightly higher than our system that handling different type of
replica nondeterminism, which is acceptable due to the complexity of our
mechanisms.
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Figure 11: End-to-End Latency of Composite Nondeterminism

The results shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11 are obtained after a number of
optimizations to the mechanisms described previously. Without these optimizations,
the latency is significantly larger and the throughput is much lower, except for those
from VPRE nondeterministic operations.
In the PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE phase, which is needed to handle NPRE and
other composite types involving with NPRE, each replica multicasts its contribution
of the nondeterministic values to all other replicas, and the primary decides on the
collection (must include the contributions from 2f+1 replicas, including its own) to be
used to calculate the final nondeterministic values. Instead of multicasting the
collection of nondeterministic values, the primary disseminates the collection of the
digests of the values proposed by each replica. This sharply reduces the message size
if the size of nondeterministic values is large. Since each replica can log the
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nondeterministic values received from other replicas, a replica can verify the digests
provided by the primary replica using its local copies. A replica might not have
received the values proposed by one or more replicas included in the primary’s
message, in which case, the replica asks for retransmission of the values.
During the POST-COMMIT phase, which is needed to handle NPOST nondeterminism, the data in the postn log is piggybacked with the PRE_PREPARE
message for the next REQUEST. This way, the Byzantine agreement for the
nondeterministic values is reached together with that for the ordering of that
REQUEST, which reduces the number of messages needed to handle this type of
replica nondeterminism. Even though the end-to-end latency for a REQUEST
increases slightly as a restem throughput is significantly improved. To avoid waiting
indefinitely for the next REQUEST, the primary sets a timer. When the timer expires,
the primary initiates the Byzantine agreement phases for the nondeterministic values
in conjunction with a null REQUEST so that the existing mechanisms can be reused.
It may be surprising to see that the end-to-end latency for a REQUEST with
NPRE is similar to, or slightly larger than, that for a request with NPOST when there
are large quantity of nondeterministic values. With the above optimization, the PREPREPARE-UPDATE phase involves with at least two large messages (one message
per replica on its proposed nondeterministic values) while the POST-COMMIT phase
(needed to handle NPOST) involves with only one large message (sent by the
primary). Due to the same reason, the throughput for requests with NPOST is higher
for those with NPRE when enough concurrent clients are present (so that virtually all
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post-determinable nondeterministic values are piggybacked with the PRE_PREPARE
messages for other requests, rather than being sent as separate messages).
Figure 12 shows the result of throughput performance for pure replica nondeterminism. And accordingly Figure 13 shows the throughput for composite replica
nondeterminism.
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Figure 12: Throughput of Pure Nondeterminism
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Figure 13: Throughput of Composite Nondeterminism

4.2.3 Online Poker Game
To demonstrate ND-BFT’s performance on real application, we conducted the
experiments for our online poker game replicated with ND-BFT library. The
programming language we used to develop the online poker game is Java. We use JNI
(Java Native Interface) technique to connect the online poker game with ND-BFT
library. The experiments include throughput measurement with different number of
players. We run the experiments using the same network environment as the
experiment for ND-BFT library. For players who request to the replica will only issue
one request to the replica to invoke the shuffling function to shuffle the card. On
receiving the command from the player, each replica runs 1,000 consecutive iterations
for the card shuffling. There are no waiting times for the players. We measure the
system throughput by calculating the elapse time. We analyze the performance of
online poker game without view-changes or proactive recovery. We start by
54

presenting results of experiments that ran with four replicas. We conduct the second
experiment with seven replicas (may tolerate two faulty replicas).
For comparison purposes, the size of each request and reply still kept at 1KB.
As we described in previous section, online poker games require a seed to generate a
random number which always containing NPRE. To exhibit our algorithm could be
applied on practical applications, we compare the performance between the poker
game with and without our library; we only wrote code for it to work in the normal
case.
Figure 14 present results of the throughput performance comparison between
the original online poker game and the replicated online poker game, respectively, in
a configuration with four replicas. The comparison between ND-BFT and NO-REP
shows that if there are less than four players, the performance of ND-BFT is close to
the performance of NO-REP. The throughput of ND-BFT increase rapidly when there
are more than four players in the game. Percentage-wise, the comparison of the
throughput performance is lowered by 30% to nearly 50%, which indicated that this
library would be more efficient when running under lightweight environment which
have a small number of players.
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Figure 14: Throughput for online poker game (4 replicas)

Figure 15 presents the throughput measured with seven replicas. The average
throughputs of both mechanisms are lower than the mechanism in previous
experiment due to the number of replicas is increased. However, it might be
surprising to find out that the throughput performance for seven replicas ND-BFT are
very close to the four replicas ND-BFT. This could be helpful information for
software designers because they can increase the security of their system without
degrade the performance significantly. As the number of players increased, the
throughput performance of NO-REP is increased by approximate 10% to 35% higher
than ND-BFT.
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Figure 15: Throughput for online poker game (7 replicas)

There are two conclusions we gain from the experiment. First, our current
mechanism would be more appropriate to be applied on the games which have small
number of players. And there are more optimization works need to be done to
improve the performance of the mechanism to be able to survive in large game which
have considerable asynchronous network players. Secondly, the result shows that
improving the resilience of the system by increasing the number of replica from four
to seven does not degrade performance significantly.

57

CHAPTER V

RELATED WORKS

There is a vast body of research in the areas of fault tolerance and state
machine replication. We present a brief overview of replication protocols to tolerate
Byzantine fault for on practical istic applications. Our main focus, however, is on
handling replica nondeterminism problem for Byzantine-fault-tolerant state machine
replication protocols that provide support for general operations in an asynchronous
environment.
Replica nondeterminism has been studied extensively under the benign fault
model. However, there is no systematic classification of the common types of replica
nondeterminism, therefore less attention has been payed on handling such nondeterminism. [7] did provide a classification of some types of replica nondeterminism.
However, they largely focused on the types of wrappable nondeterminism and
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verifiable pre-determinable nondeterminism, except for nondeterminism caused by
asynchronous interrupts, which we do not address in this work.
The replica nondeterminism caused by multithreading has been studied
separately from other types of nondeterminism, again, under the benign fault mode
only, in[5, 6, 11, 15]. However, these studies provided valuable insight on how to
approach the problem of ensuring the consistency of replicated multithreaded
applications. It is realized that what matters in achieving replica consistency is to
control the ordering of different threads on access of shared data. The mechanisms to
record and to replay such ordering have been developed. So do those for
checkpointing and restoring the state of multi-threaded applications (for
example,[21]). Even though the se mechanisms alone are not sufficient to achieve
Byzantine fault tolerance for multithreaded applications, they can be adapted and used
towards this goal. In this thesis, we have shown when to record and partially verify
the ordering, how to propagate the ordering, and how to provision for problems
encountered when replaying the ordering, all under the Byzantine fault model.
Under the Byzantine fault model, the main effort on the subject of replica nondeterminism control so far is to cope with wrappable and verifiable pre-determinable
replica nondeterminism. In[17, 18], Castro and Liskov provided a brief guideline on
how to deal with the type of nondeterminism that requires collective determination of
nondeterministic values. The guide is very important and useful, as we have followed
in this work. However, the guideline is applicable to only a subset of the problems we
have addressed.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS

The growing reliance of our society on computer demands highly-available
systems that provide correct service without interruptions. Byzantine faults such as
software bugs, operator mistakes, and malicious attacks are the major cause of service
interruptions. Byzantine fault tolerant algorithms have been invented to handle
Byzantine faults by replicating servers and making them working in the same order.
Replica nondeterminism, a problem that would disrupt the consistency of replica does
not be addressed in Byzantine fault tolerant algorithms. Therefore there are no
appropriate ways to handle such problem which is obtained by the majority of
practical applications. This issue must be handled to ensure the total ordering of a
Byzantine fault tolerant system.
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This thesis presented a classification of common types of replica
nondeterminism, and the mechanisms to handle them in the context of Byzantine fault
tolerance. We also described how to integrate our mechanisms into a well-known
BFT framework. Furthermore, we conducted extensive experiments to evaluate the
performance of the BFT framework extended with our mechanisms and, for the first
time, replicate a real online application, online poker game with our library-ND-BFT.
This chapter presents a summary of the main results in the thesis and direction
for future works.

6.1 Summary
This thesis describes ND-BFT, a state-machine replication algorithm that
based on Byzantine fault tolerant algorithm that handles replica nondeterminism
problems occurred during the toleration of Byzantine faults.
BFT algorithms highly reply on replica consistency. BFT is the first statemachine replication algorithm that works correctly in asynchronous systems with
Byzantine faults, in addition, it guarantees liveness provided message delays are
bounded eventually, which require all replica execute the operation in the same order.
It is a bad assumption that all replicas are deterministic, for instance, some services
are data and time-last-modified which are set by reading the server's local clock, and
if each server is in different location, the consistency of the whole system would
diverge. Therefore, the mechanism to handle such behavior is necessary and needed.
It is also bad to assume that the replica nondeterminism can be treated in the
same way. In the research of BFT, Castro and Liskvo simply treat the replica
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nondeterministic problem by having the primary select the nondeterministic value
independently or based on values provided by the replicas. The mechanism which
categorized as wrappable nondeterminism and verifiable pre-determinable
nondeterminism is indeed adequate for some services such as NFS. However, to
provide our services in all practical application, a systematic categorization of all
replica nondeterministic behavior is highly desired.
In this thesis, we categorized the replica nondeterministic into four types:
VPRE, NPRE, VPOST and NPOST. ND-BFT, a generic program library with a
simple interface, is based on BFT to provide a complete solution to each type of
replica nondeterminism to the problem of building real services that tolerate
Byzantine faults. For example, it includes efficient techniques to garbage collection
information, to transfer state to bring replica up-to-date, to retransmit messages, and
to handle services with different type of replica nondeterminism. The thesis presents a
real service that was implemented using the ND-BFT library: the first Byzantinefault-tolerant application that could handle complex replica nondeterministic
problems.
The ND-BFT library and the corresponding ND-BFT application perform
well. For example, ND-BFT performs only 13% lower throughput than BFT library
and ND-BFT poker game performs 24% lower throughput than the nonreplicated
poker game. Considering the ND-BFT could mask nondeterministic software errors,
which seems to be the most persistent since they are the hardest to detect, the
performance reduction is really acceptable. In fact, we always encountered such a
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software bug while running our system. Our algorithm was able to continue running
correctly in the presence of such kind of failure.
Additionally, the benefit of our algorithm can be increased by taking steps to
increase diversity. One possibility is to have the diversity in the execution
environment: the replicas can be administered by different people; they can be in
different geographic locations; can they can have different configurations, for
instance, run schedulers with different parameters or run different combination of
services, but the ordering of the system is consistent. Thus the service provided by the
system is reliable and totally ordered.

6.2 Future Work
We want to conduct deeper research that focusing on improve resilience to
software bugs and online services, since the increasing popularity of those services
would definitely bring the attention of hackers who wish to take the advantage by
hacking or sabotaging those services. Not only online gaming application such as
Blackjack and Texas Hold'em, but also several independent implementations
available of operating systems and important services (e.g., file systems, databases,
and web servers), replicas can run different operating system and different
implementations of the code for these services. It is necessary to implement a small
software layer for this to work. This could be simplified by the using existing
protocols to access important services. There are also some research works on how to
make this layer works more efficiently.
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It is possible to improve security by combining our algorithm with other
existing Byzantine fault tolerance algorithm. For instance, there are some interesting
issues on using threshold signature techniques to replace BFT algorithm. The adapted
BFT algorithm consists of three communication rounds (under normal operation) for
Byzantine agreement and an additional round run at the beginning for key shares
distribution. The Byzantine agreement algorithm works similar to the BFT algorithm
except the third round, where each replica generates a partial signature (using its key
share) to sign the client’s message and piggyback the partial signature to the Commit
message. Each replica combines the partial signatures into a threshold signature. The
signature is then mapped into a number to seed the PRNG. Despite the elegance of the
threshold signature, the algorithm, however, might not be practical in the Internet
environment. First of all, it depends on a trusted dealer at the beginning to generate a
key pair, divide the private key into several key shares and it must also be responsible
for distributing the key shares to all replicas. If the dealer is compromised, the entire
system can be easily penetrated by the adversary. Meanwhile, the threshold signature
is computationally expensive, especially when generating the threshold signature (for
a 1024-bit threshold signature it usually takes 73.9ms on IBM xSeries 330 1U
rackmount PC with 1.0GHz Pentium III CPUs, 1.5 GB EEC PC133 SDRAM, and two
36 GB IBM UltraStar 36LZX hard drives)(Rhea et al., 2003). Furthermore, the validity
on the use of the threshold signature as the seed to the PRNG remains to be proved
secure.
This thesis focused on the performance of the ND-BFT library in the normal
case. It is important to perform an experimental evaluation of the reliability and
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performance of our library with faults by using fault-injection techniques. The
difficulty is that attacks are hard to model. Ultimately, we would like to make a real
service on Internet and develop the modules and tools to record, verify and replay
nondeterministic values to evaluate ability of our algorithm.
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